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FRaNcey RUssell
Unity and Synthesis in the Ego Ideal: Reading 
Freud’s Concept through Kant’s Philosophy
although men are not normally aware of it, they must 
believe that they are something more than they are, in 
order to be capable of being what they are; they need 
to feel this something more above and around them . . . 
—Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities
I
Throughout the transformations of his theories of mind, 
Freud consistently regarded the ego as the seat of mental 
organization and synthesis. In contrast to the chaotic id, the 
ego is a “coherent organization of mental processes” (Freud, 
1923, p. 17), working reactively, on the one hand, by excluding 
unconscious impulses, and actively, on the other, by structuring 
and binding mental content and libidinal energy. additionally, 
the ego’s organizational activity is directed not only towards 
the psyche itself, but also towards the environment or external 
world, facilitating judgments about and representations of that 
world.
In “On Narcissism: an Introduction” (1914), Freud sug-
gests for the first time that the ego qua synthetic and synthesiz-
ing structure “cannot exist in the individual from the start; the 
ego has to be developed” (p. 77, emphasis added). That is, while 
Freud continues to regard the ego as the source of order and 
unity of mental contents, in 1914 he suggests that such order is 
not present at the beginning of life but must subsequently be 
developed. Thus, Freud attempts to provide a genetic account 
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of psychic order, a developmental story of how the ego comes 
to be the organizational locus of mental life.
What is unique to “On Narcissism” is this suggestion that 
such organization is not simply given but is the ego’s proper 
accomplishment; or rather the ego is that accomplishment. 
Insofar as it is developed, as Freud suggests, psychic order is 
something pursued, and therefore something potentially lost 
or perverted. “On Narcissism” represents Freud’s attempt to 
provide the grounds and conditions for the ego qua coherent 
organization, which is to say, the conditions for the basic unity 
and organization of human experience. More specifically, inso-
far as the ego is organized by means of the inclusion of certain 
mental contents and the exclusion of others, and insofar as 
this organization is not fixed once and for all but processual or 
dynamic, it seems that the ego operates in light of something 
like an ideal or standard of order in accordance with which its 
organizational discriminations are made.
Freud introduces two novel concepts in order to explicate 
the genesis of mental order and unity: primary narcissism and 
the ego ideal, that out of which the ego develops and that to-
wards which the ego strives. While the latter will become more 
or less identified with the super ego and moral conscience in 
Freud’s later work, I suggest here that the ego ideal should 
instead be understood as the essential concept for accounting 
for the ego’s defining feature, namely, the tendency toward 
organization and internal unity, and that the voice of the super-
ego is but a sub-feature of that organizational tendency. Put 
otherwise, the capacity for moral discrimination and evaluation 
is one expression of the more general cognitive capacity for 
discrimination, evaluation, and organization broadly speaking. 
It is my claim that the ego ideal provides the ego its needed 
pattern or goal of unity and synthesis, that in light of which 
psychic order is pursued. I will further argue that the ego 
ideal—the projection of the satisfactions of primary narcissism 
as a goal—is that which initiates and enables the ego’s progres-
sive growth and increasing complexity: in the words of Janine 
chasseguet-smirgel (1985), the ego ideal makes possible psychic 
investment in development as such (p. 30). The ego ideal thus 
provides the model in accordance with which the ego organizes 
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and orders, and further, it functions as the always-outstanding 
end of total order and completeness, ensuring that the ego’s 
order is not stagnant but dynamic and developing. 
a broader implication of this reading of the ego ideal is 
that an ordered experience of self and world cannot be se-
cured by ego and world alone; rather, the ego requires some 
encompassing guiding principle or ideal in light of which 
its incremental engagements with the world come to hang 
together as an organized whole. With this in mind, I will sug-
gest that understanding the ego ideal as the cognitive function 
responsible for the cohesiveness of human experience has a 
particular philosophical significance. That is, this Freudian 
story offers a potential response to a problem in the history 
of philosophy, namely the Kantian problem of the systematic 
unity of experience. 
II
Kant’s revolutionary philosophical contribution was to sug-
gest that the world is not simply given to a passive recipient, but 
is rather formed and conditioned by certain active cognitive 
capacities; that is, the mind conditions how anything can ap-
pear, how anything can count as significant or real. In this sense 
Kant’s is a properly self-conscious or self-reflective philosophy, 
concerned not with the world itself, but with reflecting on what 
the mind brings to its meaningful encounters with that world.
In the analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant enumer-
ates the forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories 
of the understanding as the conditions of possibility for human 
experience and knowledge of the world. These elements are 
formally constitutive of any particular experience or knowledge 
of an object; in this way, human knowledge results from the 
world’s meeting the mind’s formal demands or standards of 
objectivity. yet, while space, time, and the categories condition 
any particular experience, Kant is not yet able to explain how 
the collection of specific experiences or the bits of knowledge 
yield an ordered whole rather than a contingent aggregate. That 
is, in the analytic Kant does not yet account for the general 
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epistemic or experiential coherence and unity thanks to which 
any particular object or experience is salient or meaningful. 
If the mind contributes so fundamentally to the intelligibility 
of each particular experience, what kind of contribution does 
it make such that our world and experience can cohere in an 
overarching and ordered whole?
according to Kant, while the faculty of the understanding 
is limited to conceptualizing only what is given in intuition, the 
faculty of reason is characterized by a “natural” and “inevitable” 
tendency to transgress the limits of intuition in search of what 
Kant calls the unconditioned: the totality of knowledge and ex-
perience of which any given particular is an integrated part 
(a298/B354; references to the Critique are to the standard a 
and B pagination of the first and second editions respectively). 
Reason is “driven on by an inward need” (B21) to understand 
that which, by Kant’s definition, cannot possibly be known. 
Thus, even within the finite boundaries assigned to it by Kant’s 
system, the human mind is endowed with a driven need to exceed 
those boundaries, a faculty of excess that strives to achieve an 
impossible goal.
While Kant insists that all attempts to know that which is 
beyond the conditions of space and time are senseless, he sug-
gests that reason’s restless endeavor (Bxv) to find the uncondi-
tioned can be put to good and proper use (a643/B671). This 
involves taking the idea of reason—the unconditioned—not 
as a given object but as a “task” or a “problem” (a508/B536), 
as an unreachable “goal” (a510/B538) set for the understand-
ing. That is, reason sets the understanding with a necessarily 
impossible goal—to proceed through the series of conditions 
to the unconditioned (a308/B364)—and in this way demands 
a kind of organizational work from the understanding, in full 
acknowledgment that this work will never be completed, the 
goal of absolute systematicity or totality will never be reached; 
in this way, the projected goal is not sought in experience but 
functions instead to organize and motivate human experience. 
Whereas the concepts are properly “constitutive” of objects in 
the world, the ideal of systematicity is “regulative,” which is 
to say it functions as a (no less essential) recommendation or 
guide, rather than a strict conceptual rule. By projecting the 
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goal of systematicity for the understanding, reason provides 
human knowledge with an overarching if impossible goal in 
light of which all of its incremental achievements are assessed.
With this regulative idea of systematic unity, Kant is indi-
cating that the human intellect, while finite and conditioned, 
must operate in light of the more comprehensive idea of the 
whole or unconditioned. While Kant expressly submits that 
subject and object, thought and world, are co-constitutive 
and mutually conditioning, he seems now to be suggesting 
that their relationship depends upon some overarching third 
term, a unity or order within which subject and object can be 
coordinated, related and differentiated. The comprehensive 
ideas of reason, or ideals of comprehensiveness, supplement 
the understanding with two necessary and related features that 
it would not have alone. 
First, by projecting an ideal of completeness and syste-
maticity as a task or goal, reason makes possible development 
or progress in knowledge and experience. Because reason can 
conceive the unconditioned, whereas the understanding can 
only comprehend what is given in experience (a311/B367), 
the former is able to set an ideal goal in the mode of (pure) 
possibility that the latter would be unable to formulate on its 
own. In this way, while the understanding can acquire only 
an aggregate of knowledge, reason can demand an ongoing 
organization in the acquisition of knowledge with the aim of 
constructing a system. as Kant frequently insists, reason is only 
concerned with the higher order task of bringing the under-
standing into thoroughgoing consistency with itself (a323/
B380). Thus reason demands an ideal of complete coherence 
and systematization of knowledge such that the understand-
ing can develop, not merely mechanically or additively, but 
in accordance with some specific aim. In this way, the work of 
the understanding is given an overarching purpose in light of 
which its products make sense at all.
second, reason imbues the activity of the understanding 
with sense or value. By projecting an ideal towards which the 
understanding must work, reason provides a purpose and 
thereby a value to that very work. Pieces of knowledge have 
value—or even more basically make sense—only insofar as they 
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occupy a place in a larger domain of thought, a domain which 
is never itself encountered but is projected as the intelligible 
milieu in which thoughts have traction. as is clear by the very 
notion of the ideal, with the faculty of reason Kant introduces 
the idea of a standard of perfection or value against which we 
can judge the products of the understanding. The projection 
of an ideal allows for the qualitative assessment of the organiza-
tion of the understanding and demands that the latter work to 
approximate the perfect systematicity of the ideal.
Thus towards the end of the first Critique, Kant appears 
to be suggesting that the transcendental conditions outlined 
in the analytic are not sufficient for human experience, that 
an epistemic relationship to the world cannot be secured by 
concepts and intuition alone, but that something beyond the 
understanding, even “contrary to common sense” (a302/
B358), is required. at the risk of compromising the integrity of 
his system, Kant advances, though does not fully endorse, the 
idea that the dynamic, cumulative systematicity characteristic 
of human experience is a condition for and irreducible to 
the functioning of the understanding, necessary for coherent 
thought and yet beyond the straightforwardly thinkable.
abstracting from both Kantian and psychoanalytic ter-
minology, we can understand the question animating both 
projects as the following: What feature of mind contributes 
to the coherence and unity—the “systematicity”—of human 
experience? What elevates experience from a disorganized or 
meaningless aggregate to an ordered and meaningful whole?
Now it is certainly true that Kant’s project was a transcen-
dental investigation into the formal or structural conditions for 
objective knowledge, and he was expressly not concerned with 
human psychology, let alone with the idiosyncrasies of individual 
psychic structures that constitute the object of psychoanalysis. 
yet my concern here is not to argue that Kant makes significant 
contributions to psychology, but rather that Freud can be un-
derstood as making an important contribution to philosophy.
I argue, then, that Freud offers a developmental account 
of psychic order and unity, and thereby provides a tenable 
response to the philosophical problem of the systematic unity 
of experience, originally raised by Kant. Whereas Kant was 
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compelled by his transcendental method to insist that the 
unity and systematicity of experience could not be derived 
from experience but had to be operative a priori, with his de-
velopmental account of the ego, Freud perceived that psychic 
order and unity is an early achievement, an account which, 
moreover, allows for the possibility that such order might not be 
established or might be lost. In his metapsychological writings 
Freud, like Kant, is concerned with the conditions of possibility 
for human experience, but he pursues the un-Kantian insight 
that these conditions are not fixed or given; rather they are the 
never-guaranteed products of development. Following Kant’s 
observation that any conception of experience must involve a 
conception of unity, and so any experience must call upon or 
presuppose such unity, Freud proposes that this unity is both 
requisite and precarious, necessary and a contingent accom-
plishment of development. With the ego ideal Freud is attempt-
ing to account for the necessity of psychic unity as a condition 
for experience, a formal condition that is, paradoxically, itself 
conditioned. It is this paradox of psychic unity—how it is that 
the unity of experience does not exist from the start but has 
to be developed within experience—that Freud both indicates 
and attempts to resolve.
III
Before attending to the concept of the ego ideal as articu-
lated in “On Narcissism,” it will be helpful to first provide an 
overview of Freud’s conceptualization of the ego with respect 
to order and unity to demonstrate the extent to which Freud 
regarded the ego as, paradoxically, both the source and the 
result of psychic organization. as will become clear, the kinds 
of mental conflict that psychoanalysis was designed to resolve 
could only occur in an organized and organizing psychic ap-
paratus, one based on the inclusion and ordering of certain 
elements, and the rejection or repression of others.
as early as the first case studies in 1893, Freud envisaged the 
ego as the organizational function of the mind, the maintenance 
of which motivated the exclusion of certain unacceptable ideas 
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from consciousness. While the affect associated with the idea 
could become attached to another representative—for example, 
in the form of hysterical symptoms—the original thought or 
wish is rejected, the ideational content having been judged 
incompatible with the ego as a whole. Only much later would 
Freud offer anything close to a developmental ego psychol-
ogy, and at this point, the ego is simply taken as a given. yet 
crucial to his first theories of repression and psychic conflict 
is the concept of a conscious ego organized by certain com-
mitments and committed to a certain organization. as Freud 
(1893) writes: “the basis for repression itself can only be ... the 
incompatibility between the single idea that is to be repressed 
and the dominant mass of ideas constituting the ego” (p. 116). 
Repression is an expression of the ego’s commitment to internal 
coherence by excluding those ideational elements that would 
come into contradiction with its “dominant mass of ideas.”
In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud (1900) attributes the 
work of the censoring ‘secondary revision’ of dream content 
to the ego; he writes, “there is no doubt, then, that it is our 
normal thinking that is the psychical agency which approaches 
the content of dreams with a demand that it must be intelli-
gible” (p. 499). “Normal thinking,” or the ego, rejects not only 
unpalatable or disturbing thoughts, but also those thoughts that 
appear unintelligible from the ego’s perspective. any mental 
content that cannot meet the “demand” of intelligibility will 
be repressed, forgotten, or re-worked such that it makes sense, 
that is, has a place within the organized whole of the ego. 
yet, while it is clear that “normal thinking” issues the demand 
of intelligibility, what remains mysterious is what the specific 
nature of that demand amounts to. That is, Freud has not yet 
accounted for how anything like normal thinking comes to be 
developed, nor has he yet provided a standard with reference 
to which ideas could be judged as compatible or incompatible, 
intelligible or nonsensical.
In 1910, Freud notes that “the incompatibility of [a] wish 
. . . with the patient’s ego was the motive for the repression; the 
subject’s ethical and other standards were the repressing forces 
. . . which [were] thus revealed as one of the devices serving to 
protect the mental personality” (p. 24). Here Freud suggests 
for the first time that psychic order is established through the 
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ego’s submission of mental content to ethical and other stan-
dards in light of which they are deemed either compatible or 
incompatible with the “mental personality.” In a way that will 
become explicit only with the concept of the ego ideal, Freud 
is here suggesting that the ego is an organizational structure 
that functions according to certain standards, or ideals, and 
that the maintenance and meeting of such standards influence 
the formation of the mental personality.
From this brief glance at Freud’s early work, it is clear that 
he took the ego to be an organized and organizational function 
of mental life whose operations and structure are modeled in 
accordance with ethical and other standards of compatibility 
or holistic coherence; in the case that an idea or wish arose 
that was incompatible with these standards, such an idea or 
wish would be repressed in order to protect the integrity of the 
mental personality. Importantly, it is not the particular content 
of the idea or its quota of affect that must be defended against 
but rather the “situation of incompatibility” (Freud, 1893–1895, 
p. 146) that arises between a particular idea and the organized 
mass of ideas constituting the ego.
Throughout other developments in his conceptions of the 
structure of mind, this emphasis on intra-psychic incompatibility 
as the motive for repression remains central to his understand-
ing of mental coherence. For instance, in his 1915 paper on 
repression, Freud notes that an instinct is repressed when the 
attainment of its aim—satisfaction or discharge—would produce 
displeasure. But, Freud asks, if satisfying an instinct is inher-
ently pleasurable, then under what circumstances would this 
be experienced as unpleasurable? To this problem he writes:
We then learn that the satisfaction of an instinct which 
is under repression would be quite possible, and further, 
that in every instance such a satisfaction would be plea-
surable in itself; but it would be irreconcilable with other 
claims and intentions. It would, therefore, cause pleasure in 
one place and unpleasure in another. It has consequently 
become a condition for repression that the motive force 
of unpleasure shall have acquired more strength than the 
pleasure obtained from satisfaction. (p. 147, emphasis 
added)
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That is, what would or ought to give rise to an experience of 
pleasure—satisfying a drive—in fact generates the unpleasure 
of irreconcilability; precisely qua irreconcilable with the other 
“claims and intentions” of the mental personality, the satisfac-
tion of a repressed instinct is unpleasurable. The feeling of 
unpleasure is thus the “motive force” for repression and thereby 
functions as a representative of intra-psychic irreconcilability. 
again, repression here represents an effort to achieve consis-
tency amongst the dominant mass of ideas (and claims and 
intentions) constituting the ego, which is to say that certain 
experiences are endowed with a value (pleasure/unpleasure) 
that must remain consistent with the overarching ego organiza-
tion or system. Indeed, only a psyche that held itself to such a 
“standard” of internal compatibility and organization amongst 
its “claims and intentions” would be motivated to exclude (psy-
chic) elements seen as threatening to the possibility of meeting 
such a standard—or to the standard itself.
according to Freud’s early accounts, the ego functions 
primarily defensively, with its own unity a reactive product of 
the exclusions of and resistances to the activity of the uncon-
scious. as Hans loewald (1951) has pointed out: “Freud’s first 
conception of the ego was that it represents the repressive, 
defensive agency within the psychic apparatus. Only later did 
he stress the [active] synthetic function of the ego” (p. 10). 
The earlier, dynamic approach to psychic structure distin-
guished unconscious and consciousness according to a logic 
of defense, where the unconscious is a repressed unconscious 
and consciousness a defensive or repressing consciousness. 
While Freud does not abandon the language of repression, 
the new structural approach introduced in “The ego and the 
Id” emphasizes the functioning and organization specific to 
the mind’s various agencies or loci. as loewald (1971) writes 
“the terms [‘ego’ and ‘id’] make it more feasible to visualize 
the coexistence of mental processes of different organizational 
levels, without the implication, suggested by the negative term 
‘unconscious,’ of mutual exclusion or of the active removal of 
consciousness (repression)” (p. 95, emphasis added). What this 
means is that Freud can re-conceive the psyche as manifoldly 
functioning, rather than as the interplay between mutually 
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hostile systems of defense (consciousness) and offense (the 
unconscious). Moreover, since repression and defense can 
potentially characterize a number of mental activities, Freud’s 
structural or functional account makes possible an elaboration 
of the activities, organization, and features that are properly 
unique to the ego.
according to the structural topography, the unconscious id 
is that part of the mind constituted by unbound primary pro-
cesses and operating in accordance with the pleasure principle; 
by contrast, the ego, governed by its own standard of order, 
works to bind these processes and operates primarily in accor-
dance with the reality principle. The ego is oriented towards 
and influenced by the external environment, and is capable 
of binding and organizing libidinal energies in order to form 
thoughts, judgments, and truth-apt intentional attitudes with 
regards to the real world (Freud, 1923). While the structure 
of the ego remains in part an effect of repression and defense 
against the id, this is no longer taken to be its primary or sole 
function. Indeed, in the later works, Freud suggests that orga-
nization and unity are not mere by-products of defense but are 
the definitive features of the ego’s unique functioning.
In 1926, Freud writes: “the ego is an organization charac-
terized by a very remarkable trend towards unification, towards 
synthesis. This characteristic is lacking in the id” (p. 197, em-
phasis added). and again in 1933 [1932]: “what distinguishes 
the ego from the id quite especially is a tendency to synthesis 
in its contents, to a combination and unification in its mental 
processes which are totally lacking in the id” (p. 76, emphasis 
added). While Freud does here describe the ego in contradis-
tinction to the id, it is crucial to note that the organization of 
the former is not based exclusively on the repression of the 
latter. Rather, the ego “tends” towards organization and uni-
fication, and it is this immanent and unique activity or func-
tion that distinguishes it from the id. Whereas in the earlier 
writings, Freud presents this organizing tendency as if the ego 
were ‘facing’ the disorganized id and repressively responding 
to it, here he suggests that the ego is ‘facing’ in a different 
direction, towards a goal (a “standard”) of unification and 
synthesis. This suggests not only that the ego is equipped with 
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its own tendencies and aims, but also that mental organization 
is not simply present or given but must be enacted, pursued as 
an ideal not yet achieved. as Freud (1913 [1912–13]) writes in 
Totem and Taboo, just one year before “On Narcissism:” “there is 
an intellectual function in us which demands unity, connection 
and intelligibility from any material, whether of perception or 
thought, that comes within its grasp” (p. 95).
Here Freud could not have stated more clearly that 
unity, connection, and intelligibility—all unique features of 
the ego—are goals or ideals that the ego strives to realize or 
institute. However, note that here Freud suggests that the ego 
does not strive for order solely of its own accord; rather, there 
is an unnamed and distinct “intellectual function in us” which 
demands that the ego’s contents (perception and thought) be 
so ordered. even before the introduction of the ego ideal, then, 
Freud seems to be proposing a third “organizational level,” to 
use loewald’s phrase, beyond the id and the ego; this third 
level would represent that “intellectual function” whose role is 
to demand the ego work towards unity, connection, and intel-
ligibility. Moreover, this third level is indicative of the kind of 
self-consciousness that makes possible a reflective evaluation 
of the relative order or disorder of mental contents.
By introducing this unique intellectual function, Freud’s 
approach at this point in fact keeps pace with Kant’s. accord-
ing to Kant, reason does not create concepts but orders them 
and gives them unity (a643/B6710); reason provides reflective, 
overarching organization to first-order concepts, and as such, 
“reason is in fact concerned with nothing but itself” (a680/
B708). Indeed Kant uses the metaphor of a mirror to elaborate 
the unique capacities of reason (a645/B673), and while he 
means for it to indicate that, like a mirror revealing what lies 
behind our backs, reason provides us with knowledge that we 
would not otherwise have, it seems significant that like a mir-
ror, reason allows us to be concerned with and reflect upon 
ourselves. so Kant and Freud both suggest that the order and 
unity of human knowledge and experience is a result of a 
higher-order reflection on the activities of the understanding 
or the ego. yet, again, while Kant can only insist on the extra-
worldly faculty and functioning of reason, Freud will come to 
provide a compelling developmental account of how the hu-
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man mind comes to exhibit this essential reflective capacity.
Before laying out the development of the ego ideal, it will 
be helpful to attend to Freud’s 1913 writings on narcissism and 
its relation to systems of thought and systematicity in thought.
IV
In Totem and Taboo (1913 [1912-13]), Freud presents the 
concept of narcissism in two distinct though related senses. On 
the one hand, narcissism represents an early stage of psychic 
development; on the other hand, Freud suggests that the struc-
ture of narcissism is essential for the formation of “systems of 
thought,” or systematic thinking in general. The concept is first 
introduced in the context of a discussion of animism, which 
Freud suggests is most fundamentally oriented by its belief in 
the “omnipotence of thoughts:” “primitive man transposed the 
structural conditions of his own mind into the external world, 
[exhibiting] an intention to impose the laws governing men-
tal life upon real things” (p. 91). In quite Kantian language, 
Freud asserts that this form of thought “mistakes an ideal con-
nection for a real one” (p. 83); specifically, animism believes 
that the forms of merely subjective or ideational association 
and organization—similarity and contiguity—actually obtain 
amongst things.
In a parallel fashion, transcendental error, for Kant, in-
volves employing the concepts of the understanding as if they 
described things in themselves—to which human cognition 
has no access—rather than mere appearances (a289/B345). 
so common to both transcendental error and animism is a 
mistaken belief in the substantial reality of merely ideal objects 
and relations. Further, common to the projects of both tran-
scendental idealism and psychoanalysis is a critical reflection on 
the conditions and limits of human knowledge, and an aban-
donment of the presumptuous and erroneous (metaphysical 
or neurotic) projection of subjective features of thought onto 
things in themselves.
However, as we shall see, Freud begins to recognize that 
the projection of systematicity onto the external world is not 
necessarily or in all cases pathological, but is in fact a condition 
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for coherent and consistent thought as such. likewise, in the 
appendix to the Dialectic—as though it were an afterthought—
Kant begins to suggest that recourse to reason’s ideal of syste-
maticity does not ipso facto constitute a transcendental error; 
rather, when employed merely regulatively, as a non-dogmatic 
guide or pattern, this idea functions as a crucial condition for 
knowledge and experience. That is, human cognition must 
project the idea of unity and order into the world (a651/B679) 
if experience of the world is to have the requisite character of 
unity and order.
What we see evidenced by both thinkers here is a funda-
mental ambivalence about the extent of the influence of “ideal” 
structures on our experience of the “real” world, about the 
extent to which the notions of ideal and real could in fact be 
meaningfully distinguished. While Kant’s “copernican turn” 
precisely insisted that reality must conform to our concepts of 
it, that the only objects of which we can legitimately speak are 
those that assume the forms dictated by the human mind, he 
did not endorse the idea that human reason could likewise 
constitute or determine the systematic unity of reality (a648/
B676). likewise, while the psychoanalytic enterprise avows the 
constitutive or formative influence of mental structures on the 
experience of reality, Freud is explicitly critical of totalizing 
or systematizing tendencies in human thinking, linking them 
most often to forms of neurosis or “primitivism,” to delusion 
or wishful thinking. While Kant and Freud both avowed the 
formative and constitutive function of the human mind on 
its experience of the world, both at the same time sought to 
mitigate the prospect of a humanly constructed order projected 
or superimposed onto the world. I will return to a discussion 
of the philosophical implication of Kant’s worry about super-
imposition at the end of this paper.
Turning now to Freud, we see in Totem and Taboo an ac-
knowledgment that while the demand for systematicity can 
become pathological or defensive, the ego’s successful function-
ing hinges on responding to the demand for order and unity 
in some form. Freud suggests that the animistic phase in the 
evolution of human consciousness roughly corresponds to a 
phase in the individual’s early mental life: between the phase 
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of auto-erotism, wherein the disorganized drives cathect vari-
ous parts of the subject’s own body, and object relations, when 
the drives are pointedly directed towards the external world, 
Freud inserts an intermediate stage that he calls “narcissism.” 
Here, “the hitherto isolated sexual instincts have already come 
together into a single whole and have also found an object. But 
this object is not an external one, extraneous to the subject, 
but it is his own ego, which has been constituted at about this 
same time” (1913 [1912–13], pp. 88–89).
Narcissism is thus first presented as a phase of psychic de-
velopment and libidinal organization wherein all relations and 
“objects” are (experienced as) internal. The external world does 
not yet exist as such or have any authority for the infant at this 
phase, either as a source of satisfaction or in terms of mental 
representation; rather narcissism is characterized by the illusion 
of self-sufficiency and completeness. Importantly, narcissism qua 
unification of drives also signals the first instance of psychic 
unity and order: this first form of drive synchronization both 
cathects and corresponds to the first form of mental unity—the 
ego—which is constituted “at about this same time.” That is, the 
first form of libidinal cohesiveness or organization corresponds 
to the first psychic organization. Freud’s language is cagey at 
this point, but he is moving towards a view of psychic life that 
holds that narcissistic or internal organization prefigures the 
kind of mature psychic organization that can take account of 
externality or objects. While Freud is clear that, like animism, 
the narcissistic structure is a stage of psychic development 
that must in some sense be overcome, he is equally unequivo-
cal that narcissism is “never wholly abandoned” (ibid., p. 89), 
that something about this self-organizing mental dynamic not 
only grounds but persists throughout all advanced forms of 
mentation.
Having suggested that narcissism is the mental and libidi-
nal correlate of animism, Freud asserts that the latter reveals 
an “intention to impose the laws governing mental life upon 
real things” (p. 91) and that the formalization of this intention 
represents “man’s first theoretical achievement” (p. 93); which 
is to say that man’s first theoretical achievement or “system of 
thought” (p. 94) is expressive of the basic structure of narcis-
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sism. This is the second sense of narcissism that Freud discusses, 
its relation to the production and maintenance of systems 
of thought. In this way, he links the possibility of theoretical 
achievement as such to the structure of narcissism, suggesting 
both that narcissism is a condition for theoretical construction 
and that the latter is in some sense an articulation or formal-
ization of the former.
abstracting from animism qua specific theoretical achieve-
ment or system, Freud goes on to elaborate more generally 
on the role of “the system” or systematicity in mental life. In 
particular, he discusses the secondary revision to which dreams 
are subjected whose “purpose is evidently to get rid of the 
disconnectedness and unintelligibility produced by the dream-
work and replace it by a new ‘meaning’” (p. 95). He writes: 
The secondary revision of the product of the dream-work 
is an admirable example of the nature and pretensions 
of a system. There is an intellectual function in us which 
demands unity, connection and intelligibility from any 
material, whether of perception or thought, that comes 
within its grasp; and if, as a result of special circumstances, 
it is unable to establish a true connection, it does not 
hesitate to fabricate a false one ... a rearrangement of 
the psychical material [is] made with a fresh aim in view; 
and the rearrangement may often have to be a drastic 
one if the outcome is to be made to appear intelligible 
from the point of view of the system. (p. 95)
as we saw, Freud attributes the work of secondary revision to 
the ego, which attempts to establish coherence in that which 
appears to defy order and to make meaningful all “material” 
which would otherwise have no place, i.e., no connection with 
other material, no part in the structured whole. Here in 1913 
Freud suggests that the “intellectual function” that works to 
render dream contents intelligible also demands unity, con-
nection, and intelligibility from any material that the mind 
encounters. Indeed, he further suggests that, in response to 
this demand, all psychic material is arranged with a systematic 
aim in view, and that such material will be arranged according 
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to “false” connections if a “true” connection cannot be estab-
lished. such re-arrangement with an eye to “unity, connection 
and intelligibility” is made, not from the point of view of the 
ego, but “from the point of view of the system,” suggesting that 
the ego must assume a different perspective—the perspective 
of the system—in order to arrange the material. at this point, 
it seems that the tendency to mistake an ideal connection for 
a real one is not unique to animism or primitive belief systems 
but is operative in and necessary for (systematic) thinking in 
general.
It is certainly true that, even in the passage above, Freud 
can be (and often is) read as criticizing this tendency in thinking 
as defensive, neurotic, precisely unable to take adequate account 
of reality. yet Freud is insistent that narcissism is never wholly 
abandoned, and I want to suggest that it is its maintenance in 
advanced, object-oriented stages of thinking that provides the 
latter with adequate coherence and consistency, imbuing the 
ego’s experience of the object-world with the requisite unity 
and cohesiveness. We might say that narcissism persists in 
mature psychic functioning precisely as the drive to synthesis 
and unity, as the desire for the systematic. While this drive 
can become pathological, manifesting in the kind of paranoia 
that finds meaning and connections where there are none, its 
appropriate enactment, its “good and proper use,” we could 
say with Kant, makes possible the kind of overarching order 
and interconnectedness that imbues experience with structure 
and significance.
While Freud had long recognized the ego’s demand for 
intelligibility, what is new in 1913 is his concept of narcissism as 
the source of and pattern for this (demand for) psychic unity. 
as samuel Weber (2000) writes: 
the animistic attempt to comprehend the external world 
in terms of unity and totality [paradigmatic of systematic 
thinking in general] corresponds to the newly formed 
unity within the psyche: the narcissistic ego. The single 
point of view and the all-embracing comprehension it per-
mits thus reflect the composite unity of the ego. (p. 46) 
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With Totem and Taboo, then, Freud further elaborates his theory 
of mental unity and systematicity by way of the concept of nar-
cissism. as a phase of psychic development, narcissism precedes 
and sets up more mature psychic functioning, and as a form 
of mental organization, narcissism functions to secure psychic 
cohesion, and persists in and informs the pursuit of unity and 
systematicity. What Freud has yet to account for is precisely how 
the ego transitions from the form of self-sufficient and closed 
unity predicated on the identity of subject and object (narcis-
sism), to the kind of unity that takes account of difference, a 
unity in which the external world has a place (object relations, 
mature psychic functioning): that is, how is the structure of 
narcissism both maintained and overcome?
V
at the opening of “On Narcissism,” Freud postulates an 
“original libidinal cathexis of the ego ... which fundamentally 
persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body 
of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out” 
(1914, p. 75). Reiterating his thoughts from 1913, Freud sug-
gests that the narcissistic investment of the ego, the subject’s 
taking itself as a first or proto-object, is the original libidinal 
organization, a reflexive relation that is never completely given 
up in favor of an intentional relation. That is, the subject does 
not, as it were, ‘lose itself’ to the object; rather, it sustains a 
relationship between two terms: itself and the other. Neverthe-
less, an intentional or object-directed relation is established in 
normal psychic functioning, and part of what Freud is account-
ing for in “On Narcissism” is how the ego manages to maintain 
a balance between reflexive investment in self and intentional 
investment in the other, such that a closed narcissistic unity 
based on exclusion can develop into a dynamic organization 
or unity that can account for difference and externality, that 
is, reality.
Freud poses two related questions in the first sections of 
his paper, questions to which the concepts of narcissism and 
the ego ideal are meant to respond. First, in justifying why 
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he would introduce the notion of a primary narcissistic stage 
between autoerotism and object-relations, Freud notes that 
“a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual 
from the start; the ego has to be developed” (p. 77). The ego 
as unity and as unifying function cannot be simply assumed, 
as Freud had done in his earlier work; on the contrary, Freud 
now recognizes that he must account for how that structure 
is first established and how it is continually maintained. The 
first question, is thus, how does the unity and unifying activity 
of the ego come about? 
secondly, in arguing for an original narcissism in everyone, 
Freud finds himself asking “what makes it necessary at all for 
our mental life to pass beyond the limits of narcissism and to 
attach the libido to objects” (p. 85); that is, why is it that we 
come to invest in objects at all, how does the ego come to relate 
meaningfully to an other? If, as Freud insists throughout his 
writings, “we can never give anything up [but] only exchange 
one thing for another” (Freud, 1908 [1907], p. 145), how do 
we give up the satisfactions of primary narcissism and develop 
towards mature, externally-oriented psychic functioning? Taking 
these questions together, Freud is asking how the unified ego 
comes into being such that this unity can account for objects, 
for reality.
as we have discussed, Freud uses the concept of primary 
narcissism to designate both a stage in psychic life and a particu-
lar libidinal configuration. as a developmental stage between 
auto-erotism and object-love, primary narcissism designates, 
as laplanche and Pontalis (1973) write, “a first state of life ... 
an objectless’—or at any rate ‘undifferentiated’—state, imply-
ing no split between subject and external world” (p. 337). as 
an organization of libido, primary narcissism represents “an 
original libidinal cathexis of the ego,” manifesting in an experi-
ence of self-love, self-sufficiency, and self-satisfaction. Primary 
narcissism thus represents an idealized state of completion, a 
particular kind of “attitude towards the external world” that 
cannot account for the world’s very externality (Freud, 1914, 
p. 75). as chasseguet-smirgel (1985) puts it, “when the infant 
took himself as his own ideal [in primary narcissism] there was 
no unsatisfaction, no desire, no loss, and this time remains with 
us as an example of perfect, unending contentment” (p. 5).
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Now it is clear that in reality the infant is not miraculously 
self-sufficient but on the contrary, completely helpless and 
dependent on the object (parent); this simple fact means that 
any theory of primary narcissism must account for the contri-
butions of the parents, especially the mother or primary care-
giver. Notoriously, Freud never adequately theorized the role 
of the mother for pre-Oedipal development; his essay “Female 
sexuality” in 1931 represents his most sustained speculation 
on the mother. yet, we can read in his comments regarding 
the “attitude of affectionate parents towards their children” 
(Freud, 1914, p. 90)—indeed their own narcissistic attitude 
towards their children—a dim awareness of the role of early 
parenting in fostering the primary narcissistic state. Much 
psychoanalytic theory following Freud has been dedicated to 
supplementing Freud’s emphasis on the Oedipal drama by 
suggesting that prior to this, the infant-mother interactions 
are similarly crucial in informing psychic development. Klein, 
Winnicott, loewald, Balint, Kristeva, and, as I will discuss below, 
chasseguet-smirgel each offer unique accounts of the specific 
role and contributions of the mother in the early formation 
of the psyche, and speculate on the status or consequences of 
this early experience of the not-yet-separated world.
chasseguet-smirgel’s work on the ego ideal emphasizes 
the ways in which the parent both facilitates and disrupts 
the infant’s fantasies of self-sufficiency. she suggests that the 
child’s radical helplessness and dependency, combined with its 
inability to recognize the parent as other or external, means 
that primary narcissism is best conceived as a state of symbiotic 
fusion (with the mother) (chasseguet-smirgel, 1985, p. 26). 
In such a state, the child is constantly attended to, its needs 
quickly met, and the infant experiences this state precisely as 
magical self-sufficiency, as fantasied perfection.
During this period, the parents must, on the one hand, 
bestow upon the child the kind of “narcissistic confirmation” 
(p. 31) to which Freud only flippantly refers, thereby fostering 
in the child a sense of value and cohesion, and a self-sufficiency 
such that later disappointments or frustrations can be toler-
ated. emotional and physical care, ministrations to the child’s 
body, and affirmation of psyche, all contribute to the internal 
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cohesiveness and stability that will make possible coherent and 
stable engagements with the world. as chasseguet-smirgel’s 
emphasis on parental care suggests, the success of the stage of 
primary narcissism is dependent upon the activity and influence 
of something beyond the ego, which is to say that the develop-
ment of a relationship between ego and object depends upon 
something over and above those terms. Winnicott’s crucial idea 
of the “holding environment” as productive of the child’s sense 
of “structured integration” (1960, p. 590) is another way of 
articulating the same basic notion that psychic or experiential 
unity must be fostered and established by something other 
than ego.
On the one hand, then, the parents must establish the co-
herence of primary narcissism. On the other hand, it is the very 
frustration and interruption of this completeness that promotes 
development, growth, and the awareness of the not-I or object. 
In this way, the child comes to recognize its own dependence on 
the object, prompting it to form a more advanced and active 
relationship with it. as chasseguet-smirgel (1976) rightly em-
phasizes, immediate satisfactions and attentive care engender 
a kind of immersion in object, and contribute to the child’s 
sense of world-stability, yet a proper relationship with the object 
depends upon a minimal sense of distance. such frustrating or 
disruptive distance constitutes the essential perspective from 
which the object can appear qua object, the world qua objec-
tive world (p. 350).
Primary narcissism is a state of idealized unity that must be 
fostered, to give the child a sense of self, and finally interrupted, 
to give the child a sense of the other. as chasseguet-smirgel 
puts it: “each stage of his development must afford [the child] 
enough gratification so that he does not want to turn back, and 
enough frustration to urge him onwards so that he does not 
remain fixated” (p. 351).
The question, then, is how can this fusional and total 
satisfaction be given up? Or rather, given that we cannot give 
up any satisfactions, for what could such a cohesive satisfaction 
be exchanged? Moreover, if primary narcissism is essential for 
fostering a sense of internal cohesion, organization, and self-
sufficiency—all of which are necessary if the child is to confi-
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dently make developmental progress—how can it be overcome 
such that it is not traumatically destroyed but rather maintained 
in an advanced form?
The obvious first point, already indicated, is that the sat-
isfactions of primary narcissism cannot be maintained without 
interruption, and so, of necessity, the infant must develop an 
awareness of and capacity to interact with the object-world. 
as chasseguet-smirgel (1984) puts it, “it is the experience of 
frustration that prompts the development of the ego” (p. 33). 
yet Freud also suggests that the basic structure or function of 
primary narcissism—which, as Robert stolorow (1975) empha-
sizes, is to maintain structural, psychic cohesiveness—cannot 
be simply abandoned but must be rearticulated at a higher 
organizational level, one that can include the world. Here, 
Freud introduces the ego ideal or ideal ego as the means by 
which the satisfactions of primary narcissism are given up while 
the basic sense of unity and cohesion is retained. as he writes:
[The] ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which 
was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject’s 
narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this 
new ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, finds itself 
possessed of every perfection that is of value. as always 
where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown 
himself incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once 
enjoyed ... What he projects before him as his ideal is 
the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in 
which he was his own ideal. (1914, p. 94)
The developing ego maintains the satisfactions of primary 
narcissism precisely by projecting them “before him,” into 
the future, into an ideal that might at some point be realized. 
What is projected, stated in the barest terms, is precisely the 
possibility of self-satisfaction, the fantasy of completion without 
remainder, of there being nothing left outstanding: that is, of 
becoming one’s own ideal. speaking energetically, this would 
entail the cessation of desire, of lack, of tension; speaking in 
terms of objects, this would entail the abolition of external 
objects, of any outside at all. The ego ideal is the promise of 
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the possibility of complete, integrated, ideal unity, and it will 
be against such an ideal that the actual ego will measure itself 
(p. 93).
By combining an ego and a libido theory in his concep-
tions of primary narcissism and the projected ego ideal, Freud 
demonstrates that what is sought is not some abstract ideal 
of perfection but satisfaction most broadly speaking. We are 
properly gripped by our ideals of perfection and satisfaction, 
or we might say in Freud’s idiom that these ideas are intensively 
cathected. Incredibly, Kant recognized this as well: he speaks of 
reason as “driven by an inward need” (B21) and as “an inter-
est endeavor[ing] to obtain satisfaction” (a666/B694), at least 
implicitly acknowledging that the conditions for knowledge are 
not themselves wholly of the order of knowledge. Reason cannot 
be straightforwardly known and does not produce knowledge 
but is better conceived as a “disposition” or a “need” (B21), 
experienced phenomenologically as a “restlessness” (Bxv) or a 
“burden” (avii). Facilitated by the notion of the unconscious, 
Freud can suggest that such a drive or tendency towards an 
ideal is the expression of unconscious forms of thought within 
higher order thinking. Which is to say that higher order think-
ing does not fully overcome but includes primary thought 
processes and through this inclusion facilitates more advanced 
forms of world engagement.
loewald (1962) suggestively proposes that, as the promise 
or possibility of satisfaction, the ego ideal is a psychic structure 
endowed with a unique temporal function. The ego ideal is best 
conceived, not as a spatially differentiated “grade in the ego,” 
as Freud will later phrase it (1923, p. 28), but as a psychic dif-
ferentiation or organization arranged in accordance with some 
“temporal principle” (loewald, 1962, p. 265). In projecting 
the cohesiveness and completion of primary narcissism into 
“something to be wished and reached for” (p. 266), the psyche 
is working out a sense of possibility, futurity, which is to say a 
sense of time. More precisely, loewald suggests that this differ-
entiation in the ego does not result in some abstract awareness 
of time, but in the cultivation of “psychic time as an activity” (p. 
264), which is to say, the mental capacity to recall and antici-
pate, to bring the past and future to bear on the present. so in 
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addition to the kind of (spatially imagined) “perspective” from 
which an object can be properly experienced, as emphasized 
by chasseguet-smirgel, the projection of ego ideal makes pos-
sible the assumption of a specifically temporal vantage from 
which can be surveyed particular experiences in light of the 
projection of a temporal whole (past, present, and future).
By projecting the completeness of narcissism into the fu-
ture in the form of a to-be-realized ideal, the fantasied perfec-
tion of primary narcissism is overcome—object relations are 
engaged and the possibility of sublimation established—yet 
insofar as this overcoming is accomplished by way of projection, 
this perfection is in an important sense retained and becomes 
that towards which the ego tends and strives. crucially, while 
the ego ideal functions as a goal, it is in principle unrealizable, 
the projection of a fantasied completion that could in no way 
take place in experience. That it cannot be realized, that it 
must remain always still outstanding, is in fact the temporal 
function or arrangement that ensures the ego’s continued and 
dynamic development.
accordingly, guilt or even the simple awareness of a goal 
still outstanding are experiential manifestations of the distance 
between the ego and its ideal. and while sensations of guilt 
most often arise with regard to specifically moral deficiencies, 
this is but one form that the experience of falling short of 
one’s ideal can take; that is, the ego can experience itself as 
deficient in more than simply moral terms. The ego ideal most 
broadly conceived functions not to issue demands of exclusively 
moral perfection. Rather, it demands and promises perfection, 
completion, unity—full stop.
Now while I am suggesting that the ego ideal qua projection 
of completion and unity is not identifiable with or reducible 
to the moral conscience that will come to be embodied in the 
super-ego, as soon as Freud introduces the ego ideal, he begins 
to speak of the demands of moral conscience and the claims 
of ethical or social standards; the ego ideal is undoubtedly a 
key feature of the voice of conscience. Nevertheless, while we 
usually feel or “recognize” (Freud, 1914, p. 95) the demands 
of the ego ideal as conscience, this is not its sole or most ba-
sic function; rather, conscience is only one expression of the 
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more general demand for completion issued by the “critically 
observing agency” (p. 96).
In fact, Freud is explicitly concerned to demonstrate that 
the commanding force of the ego ideal is active not only in 
the realm of moral conscience but in other aspects of mental 
life; that is, Freud by no means intends to conflate the ego 
ideal and conscience but is interested in articulating the various 
areas of psychic life in which the ego ideal has an effect. as he 
writes, “it will certainly be of importance to us if evidence of 
the activity of this critically observing agency—which becomes 
heightened into conscience and philosophic introspection—can 
be found in other fields as well” (p. 96, emphasis added). One 
such field in which the ego ideal plays a pivotal role is that of 
intellectual endeavors and systematic or theoretical speculation. 
as Freud suggests:
the activity of the mind which has taken over the function 
of conscience has also placed itself at the service of inter-
nal research, which furnishes philosophy with the mate-
rial for its intellectual operations. This may have some 
bearing on the characteristic tendency of paranoiacs 
to construct speculative systems. (p. 96, emphasis added)
That is, while conscience is one of its functions, the ego ideal 
is also the psychic mechanism responsible for “philosophical 
introspection,” “intellectual operations,” and the (potentially 
neurotic or paranoid) construction of “speculative systems.” 
Recalling his 1913 association of the structure of narcissism 
with the ability or drive to construct systems of thought, Freud 
here suggests that what the ego ideal (qua projection of primary 
narcissism) demands is precisely cohesion, completion, order, 
unity, and that this demand is made in ethical and intellectual, 
practical and theoretical life.
Freud also suggests in 1914 that the secondary revision 
of dream content for which he had heretofore held the ego 
responsible should now be understood as an effect of the 
censoring work of the ego ideal (p. 97). We should recall 
here that Freud believed that both secondary revision and 
conscious thinking demand order and intelligibility from 
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their material (Freud, 1900, p. 499); as we saw, the tendency 
toward consistency and unity is not unique to either the dream 
censor or animism but pervades all of conscious life. Here in 
1914 Freud suggests that the demands of conscience, the work 
of the dream censor, and the construction of speculative or 
philosophical systems are all expressions of one and the same 
power or agency, all responses to the ego ideal’s demand for 
unification, for synthesis.
We can now confidently assert that the “intellectual func-
tion in us which demands unity, connection and intelligibility 
from any material” (Freud, 1913 [1912–13], p. 95) is the ego 
ideal qua projection of primary narcissism. The ego ideal, pro-
jected into the future, demands that the ego work to regain the 
perfection of primary narcissism, and the ego’s censoring and 
ordering, its inclusions and exclusions represent its attempts 
to respond to those demands. Moreover, insofar as the ideal is 
essentially unreachable, it is by means of the projection of the 
ego ideal that anything like development, progress, or work is 
possible in the first place. as Freud (1914) writes:
The development of the ego consists in a departure from 
primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt 
to recover that state. This departure is brought about by 
means of the displacement of libido on to an ego ideal 
imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about 
from fulfilling this ideal. (p. 100)
The development of the ego consists in disruption of primary 
narcissism and the concomitant projection of the ego ideal. as 
chasseguet-smirgel (1985) writes, “the ego ideal implies the 
idea of a project [...] a hope [...] together they suggest the idea 
of development, of evolution” (p. 29). While the super ego indeed 
assumes center stage—in Freud’s own thought and perhaps 
in most psychic economies—by demanding moral consistency 
from the ego, this is but one form of a more general demand 
for intra-psychic compatibility and synthesis.
It is worth noting briefly that the demands of the ego ideal 
and the attempt to fulfill them can indeed take pathological 
form. as we’ve seen, Freud recognized paranoia as a neurotic 
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expression of the ego ideal and its demands for unity, con-
nection and intelligibility, and he characterized animism and 
certain expressions of a rigid commitment to systematicity as 
forms of pathology and neurosis. More recently, chasseguet-
smirgel (1985) and Julia Kristeva (1987, 1989) have argued 
respectively that perversion and melancholia are pathological 
manifestations of the fantasy of self-sufficiency, perfection, 
total satisfaction. The pervert believes he already is his own 
ideal (chasseguet-smirgel, 1985), while the melancholic la-
ments her personal inability to realize or merge with the always 
withdrawing ideal (Kristeva, 1989); in both cases, the possibil-
ity of unity or completeness becomes rigidified or reified, as 
though it could in fact be realized. In fact, this erroneous belief 
in the reality or substantiality of the ideal is the very error of 
which Kant accused his predecessors: for Kant, the pre-critical 
metaphysicians believed that the unconditioned could actually 
be found in experience, that it was straightforwardly available 
for human comprehension. Both the neurotic and the meta-
physician are unable to accept that the unconditioned is not 
a thing or a realizable state, but an ideal whose function is to 
give value and direction to human experience. 
Thus, a healthy ego ideal functions to motivate the indi-
vidual to pursue goals or projects (that is, to sublimate) even 
while acknowledging that “achieving [any particular] aim . . . 
can never be truly and finally satisfying” (chasseguet-smirgel, 
1985, p. 7). Insofar as the ego ideal maintains this kind of dy-
namism, insofar as the ego ideal provides a merely regulative 
and not rigidly constitutive ideal, as we might say with Kant, 
it offers the ego the kind of goal or standard of coherence in 
light of which the ego can effectively perform as the psychic 
apparatus’ organizational and integrative agency.
I suggested with respect to Kant that reason’s projection 
of an ideal supplements the understanding with two essential 
functions—progressive development and a system of value—
which make possible unified and ordered experience and 
knowledge. The same can be said of Freud’s system; that is, 
the ego ideal essentially supplements the functioning of the 
ego, providing the latter with a developmental goal which 
functions to imbue any individual experience with sense or 
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value. Recall Freud’s comment in his paper on repression that 
a certain potentially satisfying experience is repressed because 
it would be “irreconcilable with other claims and intentions” 
(1915, p. 147). We can see now that the ego qua reconciliatory 
or organizational function requires an ideal of coherence in 
light of which an experience can “count” as pleasurable or 
painful, valuable or insignificant, as a gain or a loss. In ways 
that I have not been able to discuss here, the specific shape or 
pattern of the ego ideal will depend upon the kind of care and 
attention administered by the parents; that is, parental care will 
be responsible for communicating what counts as satisfaction, 
fulfillment, achievement, love, and therefore what the ego seeks 
in its ideal will be informed by this kind of care.1 That the ego 
strives to develop, to be more, that its experiences of gain and 
loss have weight or significance, that its life is endowed with a 
specific shape and meaning, all this is thanks to the possibility 
of completeness embodied in the ego ideal.
VI
By the end of the first Critique, the problem that continues 
to weigh on Kant is, as we’ve seen: what is the status of the mind’s 
need or demand for systematic unity? Is the systematicity of 
experience merely subjective, or properly objective and “real”? 
(a648/B676) While Kant suggests that such unity is a projected 
ideal towards which the understanding strives, he remains ag-
nostic as to how fundamental or how necessary—which is to 
say, how transcendental—this projection actually is. Insofar as 
he relegates reason’s ideal of unified order to the status of the 
merely regulative, rather than the robustly constitutive, Kant will 
grant it only an “indeterminate validity” (a663/B691).
Part of Kant’s hesitance with regard to the status of the 
demand for unity and systematicity in experience is a worry 
that such order amounts to nothing more than a subjective 
and precarious superimposition onto the world. even in the 
Critique of Judgment, where Kant attempts to respond to the still 
unresolved problems of the first Critique, and to specify and 
secure a pervasive order or systematicity for experience, he 
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remains fearful that experience might not cohere into a system, 
that experience might ultimately be nothing more than a “crude 
chaotic aggregate,” “a disturbing, boundless heterogeneity” 
(1987, p. 209). Within the terms of Kantian philosophy, then, 
there is both a recognition of the need for an overarching or 
ideal order in which any particular experience or judgment 
makes sense, and at the same time, a fear that this order might 
ultimately be undermined by potentially “chaotic” or “disturb-
ing” experience, that the demand for systematicity might not 
be adequately met.
To conclude, I suggest that Freud was likewise gripped by 
these two concerns: on the one hand, the ego must be guided 
in its effort to organize experience and mental contents, and 
on the other, this effort might ultimately fail, amounting either 
to the pathological imposition of order, or to the collapse of 
order in the face of incompatible or disturbing experience. 
yet whereas Kant seemed unable to tolerate these latter pos-
sibilities, believing as he did that the conditions of experience 
needed to be universal and unwavering, Freud’s great philo-
sophic insight is precisely that incompatibility and disturbance 
are probable features of mental life, and that the conditions 
securing coherent experience can falter or fail. We might say 
that while Kant sought for a transcendental guarantee of or-
der and systematicity, Freud accepted and worked within the 
impossibility of such a guarantee.
What Freud provides is a historical-developmental account 
of the conditions for psychic order, which is to say, paradoxi-
cally, that for Freud the conditions of possible experience are 
themselves conditioned. The projection of a good-enough ego 
ideal depends upon good-enough conditions holding wherein 
the developing mind’s sense of coherence and order is both sup-
ported and adequately disrupted, thereby facilitating consistent 
and dynamic ego development. This external or inter-personal 
facilitation of the ideal is repeated later in life, both within 
social and group dynamics (see Freud, 1921) and within the 
clinical setting; in this sense, the ideal of coherence or perfec-
tion is configured differently in different stages and settings, 
and part of the efficacy of the practice of psychoanalysis relies 
on the possibility of the transformation of that ideal, on the 
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practical adjustment of the mind’s most general orientation to 
good and bad. again, against Kant’s demand for transcendental 
conditions for experience, Freud’s developmental theory posits 
that the conditions for coherent experience are continually 
conditioned within experience.
It follows from this theoretical stance that when good-
enough conditions fail to obtain, or when a disturbing ex-
perience arises which compromises psychic functioning and 
integrity, so too is undermined the coherence of human ex-
perience, its unity and order. In these cases, experience is not 
destroyed überhaupt, as Kant feared; rather we find here the 
kinds of psychic suffering and confusion that psychoanalysis was 
designed to treat. While I have not here adequately explored 
the philosophical significance of suffering and its capacity to 
compromise the conditions for experience, by aligning Freud’s 
concerns with Kant’s, I hope at least to have indicated that 
psychic suffering, the object and orienting concern of psycho-
analysis, can reveal something profoundly philosophical about 
the conditions for mind and world, and the possible relation-
ships between the two.
Note
1. I am here inspired also by stanley cavell’s discussion of language acquisition 
in the chapter “excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of language” in The Claim of 
Reason (1999).
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